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11. Introduction
Since its first formal formulation by Kahnemann and Tversky (1979), prospect theory has been
frequently used as an alternative for traditional expected-utility approaches to individual
decision-making in the social sciences. In recent years it has also become one of the most
intensively discussed topics in international relations, and especially in foreign policy theory. In
particular it has been the special implications for risk-aversion and risk-acceptance in
international conflict which have attracted the attention of applied political scientists and
international political economists. Nevertheless, prospect theory suffers from a number of
shortages which mainly result from its roots in experimental psychology. Levy (1997) has given
a comprehensive overview of the methodological problems international relations scholars get
involved in when using the results of prospect theory for analyzing actual political behaviour in
the international sphere: On the one hand, generalizing from experimental results implies
questions of external validity, since in most cases, international relations has to deal with states
and collective political units instead of individuals, which results e.g. in problems of aggregation
and group dynamics. On the other hand, experimental results lack the framework of real-life
decision-making under risk, which may basically change the whole attitude of test persons to the
choices they are meant to take seriously. Despite valuable case studies by e.g. Farnham (1992),
McDermott (1992), McInerney (1992), Richardson (1992) or Weyland (1996), the core problem
of applying prospect theory in international relations so far has been a lack of broader empirical
evidence in real-life settings.  
This paper tries to contribute to such an empirical foundation of prospect theory in real-
life, i.e. historical decision situations by testing two of its major implications in the field of
military conflict. In brief, by using duration analysis for a data set of twentieth century battles, we
show how the experience of losses contributes positively to the resolution to continue fighting,
2up to a point where casualties clearly outweigh any direct utility drawn from ordinary expected-
utility theory. Moreover, our empirical results also indicate that the impact of the relative
position vis-à-vis one’s opponent is clearly lower when it comes to deciding whether to continue
a battle or not, than the change of one’s own position at the beginning of the fight. We take both
results as indices for the risk orientation and reference dependence hypotheses which are
important characteristics of prospect theory. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a short overview of the main features
of prospect theory and their implications for international relations in general, and for situations
of international disputes in particular. Focussing on the basic elements of war according to
Clausewitz (1832), we then formulate some basic hypotheses concerning military decision-
makers in the case of battle in section 3. Sections 4 explains the dataset and the statistical method
we use for testing our hypotheses. Section 5 presents our estimation results. Section 6 concludes.
2. Prospect Theory and International Conflict
The concept and experimental foundations of prospect theory have been summarized extensively
in Kahnemann and Tversky (1979), Quattrone and Tversky (1988), Levy (1992a, 1992b, 1997)
or Shafir (1992). It is therefore sufficient for our purposes to hint only at the main ideas of
prospect theory and their fundamental implications for international relations. Basically, contrary
to traditional expected-utility theory, prospect theory provides the analytical framework for
decisions under risk with a non-linear utility function where people’s decision-making varies
depending on the expectation of losses or gains, and on the change of likely outcomes compared
with a principally preferred status quo reference point. Thus, while the standard utility function
is defined on final asset positions, utility in prospect theory always refers to the change of wealth
resulting from a choice (reference dependence). Moreover, while the standard utility function is
3assumed to be concave for wealth, implying diminishing returns of increasing wealth, prospect
theory assumes an S-shaped function for changes in wealth, where the value function is concave
for gains, and convex as well as steeper for losses, relative to the neutral reference point. This
results in the disutility of losing an item being greater than the utility of acquiring the same item
(endowment effect). 
A resulting specialty of this utility concept is its implications for risk attitudes. While
traditional utility theory assumes risk aversion independent from a reference point, prospect
theory predicts risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses. This means that potential gains
are undervalued in the decision-maker’s calculation, while losses are overvalued relative to the
reference point. Moreover, prospect theory predicts that in a dynamic context with subsequent
decisions, people will adjust rapidly to new situations in the domain of gains, whereas the original
status quo tends to stay the reference point in the domain of losses. This means that
improvements of one’s situation are accepted quickly as a new reference point for further
decisions, while adjustments of one’s reference point take extremely long times in case of
deterioration, thus even fostering risk seeking when subsequent losses are experienced. Thaler
(1980) has explained the latter point with an example which has also been used as an illustration
by Kahnemann and Tversky (1983): A man develops a tennis elbow just after having paid his
membership fee in a tennis club. Perceiving the fee as a cost, and not using the resulting right to
use the club’s facilities as a loss, leads him to continue to play despite increasing agony in order
to avoid wasting his investment. Another illustration would be an investor throwing good money
after bad in the hope to make up for recent losses in a project which has proved to be a failure
(Jervis 1992).    
This paper does not aim at contributing to the discussion among political scientists,
psychologists and economists whether prospect theory is really a theoretical alternative to the
4concept of standard utility-maximation if one takes into account the possibilty of a more general
formal model of rational decision-making (Machina 1987, Levy 1997). We rather rely on the
outcomes of prospect theory which result in a number of important consequences for decision-
makers’ behaviour in international relations, which, from a traditional rational choice point of
view are hard to incorporate in a framework of economic optimality. Levy (1992) and Jervis
(1992) have summed up the political implications of prospect theory. First, there is a general
tendency for non-aggressive behaviour of states due to preference of the current status quo
system. For the Soviet Union in the Cold War system, for example, prospect theory implies that
the Soviet aim of consolidating power in the East European countries was more important than
expanding the Soviet Block, e.g. in Africa or Latin America. This stabilization effect of the
prospect theory perspective of international relations is increased by military deterrence as long
the defensive character of national deterrence power is explicit and undoubted for the potential
adversaries. 
On the other hand, prospect theory also implies several destabilizing consequences for the
international system when it comes to perceived losses. If a country expects a deterioration of its
international standing it can be expected to take risky and even aggressive actions in order to
prevent that deterioration. Again, in the case of the Soviet Union, prospect theory gives a good
explanation for the preparedness to use massive military force within the Warsaw Pact against
Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968, as well as for the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.
In each case, the Soviet sphere of influence was perceived as being endangered either by
expansion of anti-communist democracy into Eastern Europe or by Islamic fundamentalism
spreading throughout Central Asia. Offensive political and military action may thus be rooted in
a basically defensive framework of perception. At the same time, since prospect theory in
principle deals with individuals, it also gives an explanation for aggressive foreign policy being
5used as diversion from a country’s internal problems by politicians who want to preserve their
endangered position in the political system.  
Loss-aversion of decision-makers has also important consequences for the settlement of
international disputes and for the duration of actual international conflicts. Since potential losses
are valued higher than respective gains, international negotiations may be easier in case of
distribution of gains than of losses (Stein 1992). It seems therefore logical that international
cooperation and regimes should develop slower and less smooth when it comes to redistribution
of limited resources, like e.g. water in the Middle East, or even to the division of costs, like in
environmental protection and climate change. Concerning the effect of loss-aversion and risk
seeking in actual international conflicts, prospect theory predicts that wars, just like futile
policies, should take longer to stop than ordinary cost-benefit calculation would imply. As soon
as losses have occured and original strategic plans have failed, decision-makers do not adjust
their expectations and their reference point to the new situation but keep on engaging their
nations’ resources in the attempt to nevertheless justify the losses by success (Levy 1996). The
result is a prolongation of wars which is irrational since wasteful from an economic perspective.
Afghanistan, Vietnam and especially the Great War are striking examples for this consequence.
It is this behaviour of being influenced by sunk costs in subsequent decision-making which is
crucial for our empirical approach to prospect theory.     
3. Resulting Hypotheses on Combat Duration
We want to test the implications of prospect theory for international conflicts by analyzing a data
set on battles provided by Helmbold (1991). Following Clausewitz (1832) we interpret battles as
separate acts which together constitute a war. The data set then enables us to test the results of
prospect theory in the following framework: Given the initial decision to start an offensive
6against an opponent, the politico-military leadership of the attacking side find themselves in the
situation of whether to continue the offensive or to stop the attack. It is of course crucial to
control for the outcome of the battle. Given that one takes into account that the duration of
military combat will depend on whether one side wins or loses, the decision to continue an attack
will depend on a number of determinants including capabilities, numbers, and losses suffered. In
our view, the peculiarities of this situation of military decision-making are very valuable in
assessing empirically the predictions of prospect theory in real-life international relations. First,
in most situation of modern warfare, the decisions of military leaders will be influenced by
political considerations and be taken in an environment of group interaction in the general staff.
Contrary to typical psychological experiments, one can therefore test the implications of
individual-based prospect theory in a social group context. Second, singular battles as basic
elements of war, provide a framework of decision-making whose complexity is as limited as
possible in international relations. Although decisions in military combat are taken in a strategic
environment including interaction with the enemy, their basic structure is more straightforward
than for example decision-making about a war itself. Finally, having in mind Clausewitz’
“economics of forces”, if one takes military thinking as a special way of economic rationality,
empirical evidence for the implications of prospect theory in the situation of military combat
would be an important indication of the limited scope of standard utility theory in international
relations.
Based on the short outline of the basics of prospect theory we can formulate two
important hypotheses about the behaviour of decision-makers in deciding about continuing or
stopping an offensively led battle.
Hypothesis 1: The experience of increasing losses subsequently decreases an
attacker’s willingness to stop a battle.
7This hypothesis results directly from the loss aversion and risk affinity predicted by prospect
theory. Just like political leaders are prepared to continue a war in order to make up for previous
failures, military decision-makers will be prepared to continue fighting if their forces have
suffered serious losses, since their reference point remains the situation at the battle’s start. The
best example is provided by the experiences of the Western Front during the Great War, where
German and French losses amounted for more than 670,000 and 850,000, respectively, from
August to November 1914 alone, exceeding clearly any subsequent casualties in a similarly short
period of time during the war (Woytinsky 1928). Of course, one cannot take a linear influence of
losses on the duration of combat for granted. Even in Vietnam or Afghanistan, political leaders
experienced a maximum threshold of losses which forced them to give up fighting after a certain
though long period of time. It is decisive for assessing the implications of prospect theory when
this point is reached. Prospect theory predicts that leaders, due to their loss-aversion should be
prepared to accept an extremely high rate of casualties before becoming increasingly prepared to
stop an offensive. One has therefore to take account of potential non-linearity in the influence of
casualties on the willingness to keep on fighting.
Hypothesis 2: When deciding about continuing an offensive, leaders will put
more weight in their own side’s losses than in those suffered by
the defender.
It seems obvious from prospect theory that a decision-maker of the attacking side will overvalue
his own losses compared to his gains. Gains in this setting may be interpreted as the defender’s
losses, since the major aim of an offensive is typically to neutralize the enemy’s forces
(Clausewitz 1832). From experimental evidence we expect the impact of own losses on the
decision of whether to continue or to stop a battle at least twice as high than the defender’s
(Levy 1992).
8These two hypotheses cover the main results of prospect theory for international
conflicts, the risk orientation and the reference dependence implications as outlined above.
However, there are several additional hypotheses, apart from the success or failure of an
offensive, which cover necessary controls in modelling a military leader’s decision to continue or
to cease the attack. These hypotheses mainly result from the experience of military history, as
summarized in e.g. Keegan (1994). Again, it is important to remember that those hypotheses do
not depend on the effect of the variables on the outcome of a battle but only on the leaders
preparedness to keep on fighting, independently of his prospect of victory.    
Hypothesis 3: The greater total available manpower, the more will the attacker
be prepared to continue the battle.
This hypothesis results from the simple experience that larger armies provide the foundation for
longer battles because of the improved availability of reserves. This is one principal result of
mass mobilization since the 19th century (Townsend 1997). A leader who can rely on massive
reserves will choose prolonged fighting more easily even when success is not immediately at
hand.
Hypothesis 4: The greater the logistic, technical and information advantage of
the attacker the more will he be prepared to continue the battle.
Taking account of the important role of military technology and supplies in modern warfare, the
willingness to continue an offensive will be greater if one’s own forces are clearly superior, as far
as material supplies and intelligence are concerned. A strong position of the defender, e.g.
fortifications or trench systems like in the Great War, however, will decrease those advantages
and is therefore expected to increase the willingness to stop an attack. 
9Hypothesis 5: Given the basic decision to start an offensive, the better the
morale and the training of his forces the more will the attacker
be prepared to stop the battle.
This hypothesis seems counterintuitive at first sight since one could expect morale and training
of the available manpower to be essential elements for keeping up an offensive. As Clausewitz
(1832) or Parker (1993) have pointed out, however, both are even more important in case of a
retreat. This means that the spirit and discipline of one’s troops are especially important in case
of stopping an offensive, which is why a leader with badly trained and badly motivated troops
will be inclined to hold up the attack since he has to fear the complete dissolution of his army
when calling for retreat. Given the initial decision to start an offensive, good morale and training,
on the other hand, enable a military leader to choose the option of stopping the attack easier,
because he does not have to expect problems with his troops’ discipline.
Hypothesis 6: Leaders of coalition forces are less prepared to stop an
offensive.
First, leaders of coalition armies find themselves even more under the political pressure to be
successful, since they are basically responsible to more than one government. Their loss-aversion
is therefore further increased. Moreover, losses might be perceived to be lower by the leader in
case of a multinational force than in case of an army solely consisting of own national troops.
The Allies’ problems in coordinating their efforts in the World Wars, e.g. during the German
spring offensives of 1918, can be partly attributed to this attitude of intending to safe own troops
and to deploy one’s allies’ forces instead (Miquel 1983).
Hypothesis 7: Leaders in the two World Wars will be more prepared to accept
higher losses and thus continue a battle.
  (t)   lim
 t 0
P (t T<tt |T t )
t
,
A basic introduction to the analysis of duration models is given by Kiefer (1988). More comprehensive1
sources of duration models can be found in Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980) and Lancaster (1990). 
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(1)
This final hypothesis is rooted in two specialties of the military and political attitudes of the
opponents in the World Wars. First, in the Great War, it was military doctrines of offensive and
later of attrition which made military leaders expect high casualties and get used to them (Storz
1992). Stam (1996) gives a critical  discussion of this “cult of the offensive” argument. Second,
for the Second World War, one has to take account of the ideological character of the war,
especially on the Eastern front (Townsend 1997), which led to a high degree of fanatism and,
consequently, to a lower preparedness to stop attacks against the enemy.      
4. Data Set and Methodology 
A proportional hazard model is used to test the hypotheses outlined in the last section. This
model, which has been developed by Cox (1972) , is a method of analyzing the effects of1
covariates on the hazard rate,  (t). Recent applications of this kind of duration analysis in the
field of international conflicts include Vuchinich and Teachman (1993), Bueno de Mesquita and
Siverson (1995), Stam (1996), and Bennett and Stam (1996). Formally, the hazard rate is defined
as
where t denotes observed duration times, which are drawn from a random variable T. This
definition shows that the hazard rate is the probability that an event will end in the short interval
of length t after t, given that the event has lastet until t. In order to analyze the effect of
covariates on the hazard rate, the proportional hazard model specifies that
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(3)
(4)
where i is an index over the ordered failure times , X is a vector of covariates and  a
parameter vector which has to be estimated;  is the baseline hazard rate at time t for the
covariate vector 0. The covariates may increase or decrease the hazard rate relative to the
baseline hazard by shifting it proportionately for that duration. In principle, the baseline hazard
is a parameter for each observation which must be estimated. However, Cox’s partial likelihood
estimator provides a method of estimating  without estimation of . The main idea behind this
estimator is to obtain informations about the unknown coefficients  from the order of the
observed durations without specifying the baseline hazard . Consider the set of observations 
that are at risk at time . Assuming that there are no censored observations, the conditional
probability that observation i fails at  given that any of the observations in  could have been
concluded at  is
where n is the total number of observations. Taking the product over all failure points  of (3)
and taking logarithms gives the partial log-likelihood function for estimating the parameters 
(Kalbfleisch and Prentice 1980; Kiefer 1988):
See Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980) and Cox and Oakes (1984) for a thorough discussion of the product-limit2
estimator.
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In our case, the proportional hazard model is applied to a data set of the U.S. Army
Concepts Analysis Agency (Helmbold 1991) available via internet, which provides detailed
information on the characteristics of 660 battles which occured in the period between 1620 and
1982, covering major international conflicts from the Thirty Years’ War to the Israeli Operation
“Peace in Galilee”. The special advantage of this data set for our empirical problem is its
information on offensive operations which enable us to consider the duration of a battle as the
result of the attacking side’s leaders’ decisions only, since the defender’s behaviour is basically
excluded by defining a counter-attack as a new battle. The construction of the data set allows us
to treat each observation as a separate event with a limited operational goal. For example, the
battles of the Marne in September 1914 and of Kursk in July 1943, are split into 8 and 7 distinct
operations (battles), respectively.
In order to obtain a relatively homogeneous sample on modern warfare we restrict our
analysis to observations in the 20th century. Furthermore, we dropped all observations where the
attacker’s total personnel strength is below 10,000 soldiers. The major reason for this is the
oversampling of smaller tactical operations involving US forces in the two World Wars. Not
taking into account all observations with missing values in one of the used variables, a final
sample of 301 observations remains for the empirical analysis. The definition of the variables as
well as descriptive statistics are given in Table 1.
As endogenous variable we use the total length of combat in days (DAYS). This variable
was constructed from the dates of the battles given in the dataset. Table 1 shows that in the
period under study battles lasted on average 5 days. Figure 1 shows the empirical hazard function
which has been obtained using the Kaplan-Meier product-limit method.  The figure reveals that2
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the hazard function has a peak within the first three days. Declining thereafter, the hazard rate
remains relatively stable at about 10 percent with small peaks after 8, 15 and 24 days. After 25
days the hazard rate increases very sharply.
To test the prospect theory implications in our model we use different measures of the
casualties of the parties involved in the battle. First, we use the attacker’s and defender’s
casualties standardized by the attacker’s and defender’s total personnel strength (CASUALA and
CASUALD), respectively, and the square of these variables to allow for a possible nonlinear
relationship between casualties and the length of combat. Second, we include the ratio of the
attacker’s relative casualties and the defender’s relative casualties (CASRATIO) in order to
control for the seriousness of the attacker’s casualties compared to the defender’s. 
Figure 2 reveals that the empirical hazard rates depict very different patterns for different
casuality rates of the attacker. For casuality rates of less than 30% the patterns are quite similar
to the hazard rate in Figure 1. According to Figure 2 there is a tendency that the first peak in the
hazard rates occurs the later the higher the relative losses of the attacker. This observation
speaks in favour of prospect theory. For casualties of more than 30% the hazard rate increases
steadily up to a length of 22 days. After 15 days the probability of stopping combat increases
nonlinearly with the casuality rate being highest for relative losses of less than 10%, followed by
relative losses between 20% and 30%, and casuality rates over 30%. The lowest probability of
stopping an offensive after 20 days appear to be at casuality rates between 10% and 20%.
Apart from the described measures for casualties, we control for the absolute personnel
strength of the attacker (FORCEA) and the defender (FORCED), respectively, as well as the
relative personnel strength of the attacker compared to the defender (FRATIO). Furthermore,
we consider variables which indicate the attacker’s relative advantage in combat effectiveness
(CEA), leadership (LEADA), logistics (LOGSA), intelligence (INTELA), and technology
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(TECHA). As outlined above, we expect that a relative advantage of the attacker in these
variables should have a negative influence on the hazard and therefore result in longer battle
duration, given a control for the battle’s outcome. In order to provide the latter, we consider two
dummy variables which indicate whether the attacker wins the battle (WINA) or whether there
is a draw (WINN) with the defender being the winner as reference group. It is important to keep
these two control variables in mind when interpreting the empirical results of our analysis which
does not provide information about the determinants of winning a battle but about the
determinants of its duration given its outcome. Training (TRNGA) and morale (MORALA) are
expected to increase the hazard, i.e. the leader’s willingness to stop the fight.  
Additional variables include a dummy variable which indicates whether the attacking
army consists of coalition forces (COALI), a dummy variable indicating a well-established
position of the defender (POST), and finally two dummy variables indicating whether the battle
occurs during World War I (WW1) or World War II (WW2). It is hypothesized that a battle will
last longer if the army consists of coalition forces, while a well-established position of the
defender should increase the hazard. Battles during the World Wars are expected to last longer
due to their special strategic and ideological characteristics.
5. Estimation Results
Table 2 presents the results of three different specifications of the hazard analysis. The first
column of Table 2 shows the estimates obtained without considering the relative casualties of the
defender and the dummy variables for the two World Wars. In the second column we add the
two World War dummies and in the third we further consider the impact of the defender’s
casualties.  The log-likelihood ratio tests reported at the bottom of Table 2 show that the
hypothesis that all coefficients are zero could be rejected on the 1% value for all three
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specifications. The log-likelihood values further reveal that the inclusion of the two World War
dummies in the second specification and the measures of the defender casualties in the third
specification significantly increase the explanatory power of the regression without having
remarkable effects on the rest of the coefficients.
Let us first compare the estimated results for our control variables to our expectations
according to Hypotheses 3 to 7. The estimated coefficients show that FORCEA has a small but
significant negative effect on the hazard rate holding constant all other variables, whereas
FORCED and FRATIO have no significant effect. This result is in line with Hypothesis 3, since
it means that the bigger the attacker’s reserves, the longer the combat can be endured. It also
confirms the result of Bennett and Stam (1996) on the micro-level of warfare, who found a
positive effect of total military personnel on interstate wars. 
From the various variables measuring the attacker’s relative advantage only TRNGA and
MORALA have a significant effect on the probability to stop a battle. The estimated positive
coefficients imply that the survival time of combat decreases with the training and moral
advantage of the attacker. This is consistent with Hypothesis 5. It is interesting, however, that
the technical advantage has no significant effect on combat duration if one controls for the two
World Wars and for the casualties of the defender. Moreover, a well-established position of the
defender has no significant influence on combat duration. The insignificance of material and
information advantages thus cast important doubts on Hypothesis 4. The same holds for
Hypothesis 6, since COALI remains clearly insignificant throughout the estimations. Finally,
Hypothesis 7 can be accepted only for World War II. The dummy for WW II is significantly
negative, indicating that in battles between 1939 and 1945, the willingness to back down from an
attack was smaller than in other wars. Somewhat surprisingly, World War I which is known for
its long futile offensives in trench warfare, does not show a significant similar pattern.
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Coming to the two crucial control variables in our empirical setup, i.e. those for the
outcome of a battle, compared to the situation where the attacker or the defender wins, the
duration of combat will be shorter if it ends with a draw. This implies that leaders recognize very
fast if neither of the two armys has a chance to win. It is interesting, however, that there seems
to be no difference between an attacker’s ultimate failure or success in battle. 
Turning to the most important variables, Table 2 shows that there is an U-shaped
relationship between the attacker’s relative casualties and the battle hazard, or, in other words,
that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship concerning survival time. However, the overall
effect of the relative casualties of the attacker on the the duration hazard is always negative
implying an increasing survival time of a battle with increasing losses. Taking the respective
coefficients of the third specification one can calculate that the negative effect of CASUALA is
increasing up to a rate of 61%, decreasing again thereafter. In other words, a military leader
facing the decision to stop a battle or not will be increasingly willing to continue fighting with
casualties rising to three fifths of his available forces before changing his mind in favour for
ceasing the attack. Given that the attacker’s average casualty rate in our data set is 8 per cent,
this means that in most cases, increasing losses will make the leaders fight a battle through till the
end. Hypothesis 1 can therefore be not refused, which gives a clear confirmation of the
implications of prospect theory for our data set. 
The coefficients in the third specification show a similar but weaker pattern for the
relative casualties of the defender. Interpreting the coefficients of the casualty variables as
weights which are attributed to one’s own and the enemy’s losses in decision-making about
continuing a battle, thus reveals that the attacker values his own losses about three times as high
as his gains, i.e. the defender’s losses. This is a rate which is even higher than the experimental
ratio of 2:1 and perfectly in line with Hypothesis 2. Finally, the significant positive coefficient on
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the ratio of the relative casualties of the attacker and the defender imply that the higher the
relative casualties of the attacker compared to the defender, the shorter is the survival time of
combat.
6. Conclusion
The empirical results of a proportional hazard model show that there is a negative non-linear
relationship between the relative casualties of the attacker and the probability to stop combat.
We also found that total personnel strength of the attacker decreases the probability to stop a
battle. Relative advantage of the attacker with regard to training and morale results in shorter
battles whereas technical advantage of the attacker has no significant effect on battle duration.
Finally, battles in World War II last significantly longer. 
Basically, our duration analysis reveals that a leader’s willingness to stop an offensive will
decrease with increasing losses up to an extremely high own casualty rate of more than 60%
while the attacker’s losses are overvalued compared to the defender’s by about 3:1 in the
decision-making process. These results are in strong favour of the implications of prospect
theory and provide some non-experimental empirical evidence for the theory’s value in actual
international conflict situations. Although it remains a difficult task to provide further evidence
for testing the prospect theory model against standard utility maximization models, the findings
of this paper hint at some strong empirical foundation of prospect theory which therefore has to
be taken serious as an explanatory tool for decision-makers’ behaviour in  international relations.
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Table 1: Variable Description and Descriptive Statistics*
Variable Definition Mean Standard
Deviation
DAYS Total length of combat 5.196 6.452
CASUALA Attacker’s personnel battle casualties in 1.000 / FORCEA 0.081 0.101
CASUALD Defender’s personnel battle casualties in 1.000 / FORCED 0.196 0.232
CASRATIO CASUALA / CASUALD 0.873 1.190
FORCEA Attacker’s total personnel strength in 1.000 133.787 244.698
FORCED Defender’s total personnel strength in 1.000 87.163 158.700
FRATIO FORCEA / FORCED 2.542 1.983
CEA Attacker’s relative combat effectiveness (Ranging from -4 0.140 0.757
to +4)
LEADA Attacker’s relative leadership advantage (Ranging from -4 0.136 0.636
to +4)
TRNGA Attacker’s relative training advantage (Ranging from -4 to 0.047 0.646
+4)
MORALA Attacker’s relative morale advantage (Ranging from -4 to 0.289 0.616
+4)
LOGSA Attacker’s relative logistics advantage (Ranging from -4 to 0.113 0.536
+4)
INTELA Attacker’s relative intelligence advantage (Ranging from - 0.110 0.533
4 to +4)
TECHA Attacker’s relative technology advantage (Ranging from -4 0.086 0.335
to +4)
COALI Dummy indicating whether the attacking army consists of 0.020 0.140
coalition forces
WINA Dummy indicating whether attacker wins battle 0.628 0.484
WINN Dummy indicating whether battle ends with a draw 0.090 0.286
POST Dummy indicating existence of a well-established position 0.246 0.431
(fortification or entrenchment) of the defender
WW1 Dummy for World War I 0.286 0.453
WW2 Dummy for World War II 0.517 0.501
*: Source: Helmbold (1991), own calculations. Number of observations: 301.
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Table 2:
 Estimation Results*
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Coefficient (t-ratio) Coefficient (t-ratio) Coefficient (t-ratio)
CASUALA -9.538 (-6.79) -10.752 (-7.08) -8.892 (5.27)        
CASUALA 7.777 (3.49) 8.720 (3.83) 7.258 (3.03)2         
CASUALD - - - - -2.767 (-2.35)  
CASUALD - - - - 2.305 (1.90)2  
CASRATIO 0.280 (5.22) 0.283 (5.32) 0.232 (3.83)        
FORCEA -0.002 (-2.08) -0.002 (-2.16) -0.002 (-2.32)        
FORCED   10 -0.260 (-0.25) -0.270 (-0.25) -0.165 (-0.15)-3
FRATIO -0.022 (-0.61) 0.003 (0.10) 0.043 (1.11)
CEA -0.091 (-0.64) -0.148 (-1.03) -0.101 (-0.71)
LEADA -0.064 (-0.43) -0.104 (-0.72) -0.092 (-0.63)
TRNGA 0.394 (2.43) 0.423 (2.63) 0.403 (2.52)        
MORALA 0.212 (1.82) 0.214 (1.84) 0.213 (1.83)     
LOGSA -0.236 (-1.77) -0.162 (-1.16) -0.194 (-1.39) 
INTELA -0.087 (-0.62) -0.078 (-0.54) -0.047 (-0.32)
TECHA -0.362 (-1.77) -0.301 (-1.46) -0.169 (-0.76) 
COALI -0.733 (-1.55) -0.765 (-1.60) -0.543 (-1.14)
WINA 0.022 (0.14) 0.043 (0.27) 0.109 (0.67)
WINN 0.415 (1.77) 0.524 (2.20) 0.549 (2.31)       
POST -0.044 (-0.32) -0.095 (-0.64) -0.094 (-0.64)
WW1 - - -0.120 (-0.53) -0.040 (-0.17)
WW2 - - -0.575 (-3.30) -0.543 (-3.09)     
Log-Likelihood -1375.88 -1369.33 -1365.74
LRT (  ) 164.37 177.45 184.642
  33.41 36.19 38.932C
*: Number of Observations: 301. A † denotes statistical significance at the 10%-level, a †† on the 5%-level
(two-sided test). LRT(  ) is the likelihood-ratio test statistic on the hypotheses that all coefficients are zero.2
 
 
 is the 1 percent critical value corresponding to the respective LRT(  ) test statistic.2 2C
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Figure 1: Empirical Hazard Rate
Figure 2:
 Empirical Hazard Rates by Casuality Rates
 
